At a glance
| Client | A family-run repair company in London |
| Site | WordPress, online since 2013, ranking top three for its main searches |
| Found | November 2026, while moving the site off WordPress |
| Live for | Over four years (since July 2022) |
| Fix | Rebuilt plugin-free, every URL kept, hacked page gone |
What we found
While crawling the site to move it, we opened a 2013 news post nobody had looked at in years. The title was the same, but the body had been replaced with about 2,000 words of machine-generated casino text, with a link to a gambling site.
It was published and indexable, so Google could find it. It wasn't in the menu, so no visitor or staff member would ever click on it. In the posts list it still looked like an ordinary news post.
How long it had been there
WordPress keeps a revision history. It showed one change to that post, made on 1 July 2022, by the site's own administrator account. The site had been on a paid care plan covering updates, backups and security since June 2022, and stayed on it throughout.
So the spam went live a few weeks into the care plan and sat there for over four years.
How they got in
The change was made through WordPress itself, logged in as the owner's administrator account. That account was called admin, the first name every password-guessing bot tries, and xmlrpc.php was switched on, which lets bots test passwords in bulk.
We can't prove exactly how the password was found, because the server logs from 2022 no longer exist. Most likely it was guessed or reused. No software vulnerability was needed.
Why nobody noticed
- The security checks looked at code, not words. Malware scanners check files and scripts. Text saved through a real login looks the same as the owner writing a post.
- Nobody was reading the live site. Nothing linked to the post, and the title was unchanged.
- There was no working analytics. The only tracking tag was for a Google product switched off in 2023, so nobody could see strange traffic.
- Basic hardening hadn't been done. The site still had the default username,
xmlrpc.phpwas open, and updates were outstanding.
We also found four administrator accounts, including a temporary login with no email address and full admin rights. The DNS was sitting in the hosting company's account, not the owner's.
What was at risk
The business gets its customers from ranking. Google can label a site as hacked, or penalise it, and that hits every page. For four years, the site's reputation with Google had been helping a gambling site rank.
What we did
We rebuilt the site plugin-free, keeping every URL, title, meta description and heading, so its rankings carry over. The hacked post was simply left out. With no login page, no database and no plugins, there's nothing left for a bot to guess or rewrite.
The lesson
A care plan isn't the same as someone watching your site. If you're staying on WordPress, read our WordPress security guide. It has the checklist that would have stopped this or caught it within days.